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Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.1
Staff Judge Advocate
U.S. Central Command Air Forces
One of the most important responsibilities of ajudge
advocate in the deployed environment is advising
commanders on the propriety of the use of military force in
a given situation. Although most judge advocates realize
the importance of the rules of engagement in this regard,
not all appreciate the necessity of understanding the
underlying legal basis supporting the use of force in a
specific operational setting. The reality is that absent a
"situational awareness" of that legal framework there is
not only the risk that force will be used inappropriately,
there also is danger of the emergence of "mission creep" as
the original legal rationale fora mission becomes obscured
or misunderstood. The risk of this is especially great in the
kind of complex, hybrid operations we see today. This
brief article addresses one such operation: the enforcement
of no-fly zones (NFZs) in Iraq.
Under current international law the use of force by those
countries that are members of the United Nations (UN) is
ordinarily limited to two situations: 1) in self-defense
pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter; and 2) pursuant
to a resolution of the Security Council. Since 1992 the
United States has been enforcing a no-fly zone in northern
and southern Iraq.2 At various times, however, Iraq and
other countries have asserted that the no-fly zone
enforcement regime is illegal under international law. The
central contention is that there is no explicit UN Security
Council resolution authorizing the NFZs. While it is true
that there is no such resolution per se, it does not
necessarily follow that there is no legal basis for the NFZs.
Specifically, the basic authority for the NFZs in Iraq is
traceable to United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 678, dated November 29, 1990. This is the
original resolution that authorized the use of force in the
Gulf War. In the text, the Security Council authorized
"Member States cooperating with the government of
Kuwait ... to use all necessary means to uphold ... all
subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international
peace and security to the area." The "all means necessary"
language encompasses the use of force under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter.
C:oJJliJJ11ed 011 PtJ.ge 2

THE JAG lVrJRRIOR 1

Following the cease-fire agreement with the Gulf War
coalition in 1991, Iraq nevertheless proceeded to engage in
major military operations against members of its own
population. Kurds in the north and Shias in the south were
subjected to a series of counter-insurgency operations, often
marked by exceptionally brutal actions against innocent
civilians. Consequently, in April of 1991, the Security
Council passed a further resolution that condemned Irilq for
repressing its civilian population "in many parts of Iraq".
Furthermore, that resolution (UNSCR 688) stated that such
actions threatened "international peace and security in the
region". Because of continued attacks upon civilians in
Southern Iraq, the coalition took action to "restore
international peace" by issuing a demarche advising the
government of Iraq that a no-fly zone was established south
of 32 degrees north latitude. By denying it the use of its stillsignificant inventory of combat aircraft, this action was
designed to diminish Iraq's capability to attack its own
people. Coalition aircraft began patrolling the NFZs to
ensure that policy set forth in the demarch was observed.
Judge advocates should understand, however, that operators
often misunderstand the nature of demarches. They
sometimes assume a demarche has the same legal effect as a
UNSCR itself. This, of course, is not the case. A demarche
is simply a government-to-government communique. While
it may reflect international law, it does not itself constitute
independent legal authority. Nevertheless, in this instance it
did, in fact, reflect international law in that it was based on a
Security Council resolution that does constitute legal
authority.
It is, of course, true that some countries, including even a
few allies of the United States, maintain that notwithstanding
the legitimacy of the original Security Council directives, the
demarches establishing the NFZs exceed the scope of the
supporting resolutions. However, one might legitimately
conclude that the complete absence of Security Council
action in the intervening years, to either rescind the
supporting resolutions or direct the discontinuance of the
NFZ, illustrates that the legitimacy of the NFZ's regime is
accepted international practice.
It should be noted, however, that the legal basis for such uses
of force as Operation Desert Fox's air strikes is not exactly
the same as that for the NFZ. Essentially, Desert Fox was
based on UNSCR 687, the resolution that brought about the
cease-fire after Desert Storm. UNSCR 687 required, among
other things, that Iraq destroy all stocks of chemical and
biological weapons, as well as the related research,
development, support and manufacturing facilities. In
addition, that resolution required Iraq to agree to an on-site
inspection regime by the U.N. Special Commission
(UNSCOM). A series of subsequent resolutions (along with
formal statements to the Security Council by the United
States and others) expressed international concern about
Iraq's compliance with its obligations.
When Iraq elected to expel UNSCOM inspectors in
December of 1998, it placed itself in violation of the cease-

fire agreement. Thus, the authority found in UNSCR
678, (the original Gulf War UNSCR authorizing "all
necessary means" under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter)
provided the basis to launch the attacks aimed at forcing
Iraqi compliance with the mandated inspection regime
and diminishing its capacity to produce weapons of mass
destruction.
Following Desert Fox, Iraq engaged in an intense series
of provocative actions (ranging from NFZ violations to
the firing of missiles and anti-aircraft artillery at
coalition aircraft) that threatened the safety of coalition
aircrews enforcing the NFZ. As a result, U.S. and
British forces have repeatedly been required to attack
various elements of Iraq's air defense system. Again, the
legal authority for these actions is traceable to the
original UNSCRs authorizing the Gulf War itself.
There are a number of lessons-learned from operations in
Southwest Asia that are applicable elsewhere. For
example, legal advisors need to ensure that commanders
understand that the authority to use force is not
unlimited. It must be demonstrated in each instance that
a particular use of force is related to the purpose for
which the UNSCR was issued. Moreover, this analysis
may also affect the propriety of attacking a particular
target. Of course, recourse to a UNSCR is not necessary
when force is being used in self-defense as provided by
Article 51.
As indicated at the beginning of this essay, it is
imperative that the deploying or supporting judge
advocate become familiar with the legal authority for the
use of force in his or her particular situation. There are a
number of sources for obtaining this information - not
the least of which is the legal staff of the Combatant
Command conducting the operation. Another source that
I've found helpful is the White House Website
(www.whitehouse.goY}.
It seems to be among the earliest unclassified sources for

material helpful in determining the legal basis for a given
operation. Once the legal basis is determined (and vetted
by the appropriate higher authorities in the chain of
command), it is a good idea to reduce it to a one-page
talker and get it distributed to the staff. This allows
everyone to be (quite literally!) on the same sheet of
music. It is especially important to ensure that the senior
leadership - particularly those. who may be speaking to
the press - understand the legal rationale. Keep in mind
that the specific legal basis may also affect the legal
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status of those involved. In short, it is vital that everyone has a
grasp of this issue; otherwise, you expose your operation to
misunderstandings and miscalculations that can undermine its
ultimate success.

Col Dunlap has authored numerous articles on national security
affairs. He previously served as the Staff Judge Advocate for
USSTRATCOM. Since becoming the SJAfor USCENTAF, he has
deployed twice to the Middle East, most recently as the legal
advisor to USCENTAFICC during Desert Fox.

1 The author wishes to thank Lt Col Norman Jacobson for his considerable
assistance in the preparation of this article.
2 Great Britain and France have joined the U.S. in enforcing NFZs in southern
Iraq.
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